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Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an 
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis 
Lawrence C. Marshall* 
In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Es-
kridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief 
Justice of the United States, 1 must decide whether to adhere to various 
antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann 
Act. 2 Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these 
decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to aban-
don the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I 
advanced recently in this Law Review.3 Eskridge then offers a variety 
of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse as the 
critical legal studies and law-and-economics movements. The hypo-
thetical that Eskridge has created is not a particularly difficult one for 
me to grapple with, as the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis is not 
as wooden as Eskridge might think. I shall briefly deal with his Mann 
Act hypothetical in Part I of this reply. In the remaining three Parts, 
I respond to the each of the three concurrences Eskridge has drafted. 
I. THE MANN ACT 
As enacted in 1910, the Mann Act prohibited the interstate trans-
portation of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or 
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose. " 4 The last six words of 
this clause have been the subject of a number of Supreme Court deci-
sions. Shortly after the statute was enacted, for example, the Court 
held in Caminetti v. United States 5 that a man violated the "immoral 
purposes" clause of the Mann Act when he transported a woman 
across state lines so that she could become his mistress and concubine. 
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1979, Beth Hatalmud 
College; J.D. 1985, Northwestern University. - Ed. Many thanks to Patricia E. Sindel for her 
research assistance. 
1. It is worth noting that with my supposed appointment the name Marshall becomes the 
only name shared by three justices. Currently it is tied with Chase, Harlan, Jackson, Johnson, 
Lamar, Rutledge, and White at two apiece. 
2. Eskridge, The Case of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisisfor Stat-
utory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450 (1990). 
3. Marshall, ''Let Congress Do It'~· The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 
88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989). 
4. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (emphasis added). 
5. 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
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The Court rejected the argument that the statute was restricted to the 
transport of women for the purpose of furnishing them as prostitutes. 6 
Three decades later the Court reaffirmed this holding in Cleveland v. 
United St~tes, 7 in which it upheld the conviction of a man who, con-
sistent with his religious beliefs, had engaged in polygamy, and had 
transported a woman across state lines for this purpose. Although 
four justices expressed the view that Caminetti had been wrongly de-
cided, 8 the Court adhered to the holding in Caminetti "which has been 
in force for almost thirty years, that the Act, while primarily aimed at 
the use of interstate commerce for the purposes of commercialized sex, 
is not restricted to that end."9 
If the question posed by Eskridge's hypothetical required a deci-
sion on whether petitioner violated the Mann Act as enacted in 1910 
and as interpreted by Caminetti and Cleveland, it is not clear to me 
what the proper answer would be. Surely, adherence to a strong rule 
of stare decisis would preclude a holding that the Mann Act applies to 
commercialized sex alone, even if that may appear to be a better read-
ing of the statute as an original matter. But even a strong adherent of 
statutory stare decisis need not conclude that the decisions in Cami-
netti and Cleveland froze the definition of "immoral purpose" for all 
time. Neither Caminetti nor Cleveland suggested that what consti-
tutes an immoral purpose is a static determination that is governed by 
the intent of the Congress that enacted the Mann Act in 1910. As-
suming that the Mann Act requires a court to determine whether a 
purpose is immoral under contemporary morality, the precedents of 
Caminetti and Cleveland are not very informative.10 There is a critical 
6. Justice Day explained that while the immorality of the purpose 
would be more culpable in morals and attributed to baser motives if accompanied with the 
expectation of pecuniary gain, such considerations do not prevent the lesser offense against 
morals of furnishing transportation in order that a woman may be debauched, or become a 
mistress or a concubine from being the execution of purposes within the meaning of this law. 
To say the contrary would shock the common understanding of what constitutes an im· 
moral purpose when those terms are applied, as here, to sexual relations. 
242 U.S. at 486. 
7. 329 U.S. 14 (1946). For a detailed discussion of the Mann Act and the Caminetli-C/eve-
/and line of cases, see E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 24-58 (1949). 
8. 329 U.S. at 20 (Black, J., with whom Jackson, J., joined, dissenting); 329 U.S. at 21 (Rut-
ledge, J., concurring); 329 U.S. at 24 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
9. 329 U.S. at 18. 
10. As Judge Posner has written: 
This country's sexual mores have changed in the last thirty years and it may be questioned 
whether today a purpose to engage in adultery or fornication, when these acts are commit· 
ted without aggravating circumstances, such as force, misrepresentation, or taking advan· 
tage of a minor, is immoral within the meaning of the Mann Act (assuming it was not thi: 
intention of the framers of the Act to freeze the meaning of "immoral" as of 1910, when the 
Act was passed). 
United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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difference between the precedential import of a legal standard articu-
lated by a court and the specific application of the standard to the set 
of facts before the court. An absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
does not claim to govern applications of law to changing factual pat-
terns, or, in this case, to determine views of contemporary morality 
from cases of previous generations.11 
Congress, however, has not allowed the holdings in Caminetti and 
Cleveland to stand unaltered. Just as might be predicted with regard 
to matters on which the Court has declined to overrule outdated 
precedents, Congress has confronted and addressed the issue. In 1986, 
Congress deleted the "immoral purpose" clause of the Mann Act, in-
serting in its place a prohibition of transporting a person for "sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal of-
fense. "12 Frankly Amorous very probably has violated the Mann Act 
as it is now written, as a Virginia statute prohibits sexual intercourse 
between unmarried persons.13 
One might have thought that the statutory interpretation inquiry 
would end with the determination that Amorous' conduct fell within 
the plain language of the statute, and that Amorous' only hope of 
overturning his conviction would rest with his constitutional challenge 
to the statute. But Eskridge has created a fictitious 1993 Supreme 
Court decision, Squalid v. United States, in which the Supreme Court 
held that not all sexual conduct that violates state law can serve as a 
predicate to a Mann Act violatfon. Rather, the activity must be im-
moral, in the way that the term was used in the original Mann Act, 
and in the way that the Court interpreted ii in Caminetti and Cleve-
11. I should stress here that the courts' authority to "update" the application of the "im-
moral purposes" clause is derived from the statutory formulation itself, and not from any broad 
judicial power to reverse or ignore specific value choices that Congress has made which may have 
since become obsolete. For example, the "prostitution" clause of the Mann Act is not subject to 
the same flexible application that the "immoral purposes" clause is, for it embodies a declaration 
of Congress' intent to prohibit a specific type of conduct without regard to changing moral views. 
Whether this prohibition ought to be struck down as an unconstitutional invasion of sexual au-
tonomy is a different question. 
12. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100 Stat. 
3510, 3511 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988)). 
13. VA. CooE ANN. § 18.2-344 (1988). Perhaps an argument can be made that notwith-
standing this Virginia statute petitioner cannot "be charged with a criminal offense" under Vir-
ginia law, either because the Constitution prohibits Virginia from prosecuting him for this 
consensual sexual conduct, see Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated for lack 
of standing, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986), or because Virginia's cohabitation statute has fallen 
into desuetude. Cf. Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1986) (observing that Virginia's 
"last recorded conviction for private, consensual cohabitation occurred in 1883"); Fort v. Fort, 
12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 417, 425 N.E.2d 754, 758 (1981) ("It seems beyond dispute that the 
statutes defining or punishing the crimes of fornication, adultery, and lewd and lascivious cohabi-
tation have fallen into a very comprehensive desuetude."). I will assume for purposes of argu-
ment that neither of these conditions apply. 
2470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2467 
land I personally find Squalid to be an implausible and indeed 
"clearly wrong" precedent; considering the plain language and legisla-
tive history of the 1986 amendment. 14 But a precedent it is, and under 
the doctrine of absolute statutory stare decisis that I have espoused I 
would be compelled to adhere to it. 
Based on the "immoral purpose" limitation adopted by Squalid I 
would conclude that Amorous did not violate the Mann Act. In view 
of contemporary sexual mores, I do not believe that unmarried cohabi-
tation between lovers can be classified as immoral in the sense the 
Mann Act appears to have used that term. 15 The Caminetti Court 
may well have reached a different conclusion had this case arisen in its 
time; but it is that Court's articulation of the proper legal standard -
not its application of the standard to any specific set of facts - that 
creates the precedent that a court should follow. 
My approach to statutory construction appears to be a bit more 
"dynamic" than Eskridge anticipated, 16 and it no doubt opens me up 
to attack as wea.Seling out of the dictates of my rule by "distinguish-
ing" indistinguishables. But nothing in my proposal removes the need 
for justices to define the proper scope of a precedent. And it seems 
clear to me that recognizing changed sexual mores is not at all incon-
sistent with the holdings of Cleveland or Caminetti. 
The bulk of Eskridge's criticism does not, however, focus on the 
specific statutes involved here. Rather he offers a variety of theoretical 
and practical attacks on the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that 
I have proposed. Because the nature of their attacks are so varied, I 
respond to each of the three opinions separately below. 
II. REsPONSE TO POSNERBROOK ET AL. 
Justice Posnerbrook, joined by Justices Samuelson and Schwartz, 
begins his attack on my proposal by contending that although its goals 
are salutary, there is no empirical basis for assuming that it will actu-
ally stimulate more congressional activity. I readily acknowledge the 
lack of empirical data to support my thesis. Because the absolute rule 
14. The goal of the amendment was to eliminate the need for an assessment of immorality. 
See H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMJN, 
NEWS 5952, 5958. It is quite telling that Eskridge has had to resort to his imagination in order 
to find a precedent as obviously wrong as Squalid. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 231-35 (ques· 
tioning the assumption that there are many "clearly wrong precedents" at Supreme Court level), 
15. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 
(1976) (recognizing changes in moral and social status of cohabitation). See generally Fineman, 
Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. 
REV. 275; Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared 
Moral Life, 15 GEO. L.J. 1829 (1987). 
16. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
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of statutory stare decisis has never been implemented on the federal 
level, there is simply no probative evidence of how Congress actually 
reacts to such a system. True, some states seem to adhere to a more 
absolute form of stare decisis than the federal courts do, but the dra-
matic differences between the state and federal systems (and the differ-
ences between various state systems themselves) foreclose any 
meaningful comparisons: For what it may be worth though, the Eng-
lish system may offer some empirical support for my proposal. Until 
1966 the House of Lords refused to overrule precedents, and, even 
since then, it has been extremely reticent to overrule statutory prece-
dents.17 Parliament, in turn, has been quite active in reviewing and 
overturning statutory precedents.18 I hesitate to rely on this evidence, 
however, because I recognize the vast differences between our systems 
of government and legal cultures. 
Beyond demanding empirical data, Posnerbrook disputes part of 
the theoretical framework I have relied upon in predicting the effects 
of an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. Specifically, he questions 
my suggestion that in a world without a strong or absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis Congress would have the opportunity to pass 
the buck to the courts by telling constituents t!1at the Court may over-
rule itself and that congressional action. therefore is not essential.19 
Posnerbrook asserts that "legislators cannot credibly pass the buck 
under current Supreme Court practice" because "[i]t takes decades for 
the Court to overrule virtually any statutory ... preced~nt."20 
To respond to this important point, I must review briefly what I 
attempted to do in my earlier article. My primary goai there was to 
explore whether the Court's articulated (and generally followed) ad-
herence to a heightened form of statutory stare decisis is justifiable. 
After reviewing and -rejecting a variety of justifications that have been 
offered in support of the Court's current practice, I concluded that the 
only reasonable defense of the Court's heightened rule of statutory 
17. See A. PATERSON, THE LAW LoRDS 156 (1982); L. BLOM-COOPER {Ir. G. DREWRY, 
FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LoRDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACITY 361 (1972); 
Maher, Statutory Interpretation and Overruling in the House of Lords, 1981 STATUTE L. REv. 
85. 
18. Blom-Cooper and Drewry explain that "[t]here is a mutual understanding that courts 
and Parliament must harmonize and dovetail their respective law-making functions .... [Parlia-
ment] has on the whole responded to the invitation from the House of Lords to sponsor remedial 
legislation reversing court decisions." L. BLOM-COOPER & G. DREWRY, supra note 17, at 365; 
see also R. STEVENS, LAW AND PoLmcs: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 1800-
1976, at 615 (1978). 
19. This argument to constituents may often be accompanied with a warning that if Congress 
were to consider the matter it would likely reconsider other aspects of the legislative scheme, and 
that the constituents might well lose far more than they gain. 
20. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2454. 
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stare decisis is a normative theory that puts the job of revisiting statu-
tory decisions in Congress' hands. J then suggested that the goals of 
this normative approach would be served more faithfully if the Court 
were to adopt an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis.21 
It does not surprise me, then, to hear that legislators cannot typi-
cally pass the buck under the Court's current approach, which, after 
all, is a relatively heightened form of stare decisis. Indeed, this realiza-
tion about Congress' current inability to convince constituents to wait 
for the Court to reverse itself supports my hypothesis that as the pros-
pects for judicial reversal of a decision become more remote (both with 
regard to time and probability), the pressure on Congress to respond 
increases. 
The only question Posnerbrook can raise therefore is whether the 
marginal utility of invoking an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
outweighs its costs. Because one cannot quantify the precise difference 
an absolute rule - as opposed to the current heightened rule - would 
have on Congress' reactions to judicial decisions, the focus should tum 
to the costs side of the equation. If the costs of the absolute rule are 
nonexistent or minimal, then a theoretically plausible marginal in-
crease in congressional reaction ought to be welcomed. On the other 
hand, if the costs are significant, then incurring them for the sake of an 
unproved theoretical hypothesis would probably be a mistake. 
It is with respect to defining what constitutes a "cost" of my pro-
posal that Posnerbrook and I diverge most dramatically. Sounding 
surprisingly like William Eskridge,22 Posnerbrook argues that the 
Court's role qua statutory interpreter includes the job of altering prior 
interpretations of congressional intent in order to adjust a statute's 
practical fit with statutory, common law, and constitutional develop-
ments.23 As my discussion of the Mann Act's "immoral purpose" 
clause demonstrates, I agree that some statutes call on the courts to 
apply a statutory phrase in light of modem developments (including 
statutory and common law developments). In such cases, a later court 
does not reverse a previous court's interpretation of a statute when it 
reaches a conclusion different from its predecessor's. But in the more 
typical case, it is Congress' job - not the Court's - to decide whether 
a statute ought to be updated. Far from counting as a cost of the 
absolute rule, diverting courts from this legislative task is one of the 
primary goals of the thesis I have advanced. 
21. Marshall, supra note 3, at 215. 
22. Cf. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); Eskridge, supra 
note 16, at 1479. 
23. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2456-57. 
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Of course, Posnerbrook is correct in asserting that judicial refusal 
to revisit interpretation of statutes may mean that courts will have to 
decide more cases on constitutional grounds. Posnerbrook writes that 
the "Court often avoids difficult constitutional issues by reinterpreting 
statutes," but that under the absolute rule of stare decisis the Court 
would be forced to confront these questions, which "might tempt [it] 
toward constitutional activism, which is of course counter-
majoritarian. "24 I am not at all convinced, though, that the reinter-
pretation of statutes to avoid possible constitutional impediments is 
any less countermajoritarian than judicial review itself. Indeed, rein-
terpretation may be even more intrusive of the legislature's proper au-
thority, for, as Judge Richard Posner has written, it expands the scope 
of the Constitution's restrictions by creating "a judge-made 'penum-
bra' that has much the same prohibitory effect as the ... Constitution 
itself."25 Moreover, when a court strikes down a statute on constitu-
tional grounds it typically exercises only the negative power of invali-
dating an enactment.26 It is then up to the legislat~e to decide 
whether to enact a new statute, and if so, what kind of statute to enact. 
By contrast, when a court construes a statute to avoid constitutional 
doubts it engages in the activist task of actually rewriting the statutory 
provision to its liking. 
There is a flip side of these arguments as well. A court that con-
strues a statute to avoid constitutional questions arguably engages in a 
form of colloquy with Congress, inviting Congress to overturn the 
court's interpretation if Congress is not satisfied with it. This conver-
sation with Congress might be considered somewhat less intervention-
ist than outright judicial invalidation. But it is only less 
interventionist as compared with judicial invalidation; who knows in 
how many cases the court might ultimately uphold the statute if it 
were forced to pass upon it as a matter of pure constitutionality. 
Whatever conclusion one reaches on the merits of the avoidance 
doctrine it seems clear that it is not of such obvious value to cast any 
broad doctrine of stare decisis into question. In any event, to the ex-
tent one is particularly whetted to the values served· by the avoidance 
doctrine, it would be quite simple to carve a narrow exception to the 
generally applicable stare decisis rule in order to accommodate it. 
24. Id. at 2457. 
25. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRisiS AND REFORM 285 (1985). I discuss the 
avoidance doctrine more fully in Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly 
on Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 1990). 
26. In some cases it might find the unconstitutional segment of the statute severable, in 
which case it would leave the remainder of the statute in force. See, e.g., Alaska Airline, Inc. v. 
Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
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III. REsPONSE TO F'ISSERMAN ET AL. 
Justices Fisserman, Michaelminow, and Guidobresi define the role 
of the courts in two words: do justice. It is hard to argue with such a 
noble pursuit. The arguments only start once it is realized that these 
individuals' conception of justice is quite often likely to be fundamen-
tally different from the conception many other individuals, perhaps 
even most Americans, share. When this happens, whose conception 
should govern? Our system of government has an answer to these 
sorts of problems: we call it constitutional democracy. Under this 
system the electorally accountable branches are entitled to enact laws 
that, subject to constitutional limitations, will be applied by the execu-
tive and judicial branches. It is hard to believe that Fisserman con-
tests this model, or really contends that "we fought the Revolution" in 
order to have unelected and unaccountable judges routinely impose 
their views of 'justice" in place of legislative enactments. The battle 
cry of the revolution was against "taxation without representation" -
a label that applies with substantial force to the view of statutory inter-
pretation that Fisserman posits for the courts. 
I am not so naive as to pretend that our democracy works per-
. fectly, or that Congress' work product always, or even frequently, re-
flects the views and values of a majority of citizens. But the cure to 
these flaws in our representational system is not to divert the decision-
making authority to an even less accountable body. Fisserman rightly 
proclaims that the "courts owe their complete fealty to 'We The Peo-
ple,' "27 but she never explains how this principle translates into 
judges subverting legislative policy choices based on the judges' idio-
syncratic, aconstitutional conceptions of 'justice." 
Fisserman further contends that even if the courts properly are 
viewed as agents of the legislature when it comes to statutory interpre-
tation, agents may make decisions. As "relational agents," she argues, 
judges are expected to exercise significant discretion in shaping statu-
tory developments, even "bending the old directives beyond recogni-
tion"28 when that seems appropriate. The difference between 
Fisserman and me on this point may be one of degree. Although I 
agree that agents are typically left with the discretion to make routine 
decisions, I also believe that principals typically retain the authority to 
make the important policy-oriented decisions that come up from time 
to time. Decisions to reverse earlier interpretations of statutes seem to 
fall into this latter category. As has been suggested, it is changes in 
27. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2459. 
28. Id. at 2460. 
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the social and legal climate that often provide the impetus for the call 
to overrule a statutory precedent.29 In many cases, the dissatisfaction 
is not so much with the court's earlier interpretation of statutory am-
biguity, as it is dissatisfaction with the statute itself. To use Fis-
serman's words again, the Court is being asked to "[bend] the old 
directives beyond recognition."30 It seems quite reasonable to assume 
that in most agencies the principal will retain the sole authority to 
make these kinds of direction-shifting decisions. 
Even if my characterization of the typical agency relationship is 
accurate however, Fisserman asserts that it is internally inconsistent 
for me to suggest that the Court - as opposed to Congress - ought 
to be the one to initiate the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. 
This is a difficult point for me, for although I would certainly prefer 
that Congress be the body to promulgate this type of rule, I recognize 
that this is not about to happen. Congress is no doubt delighted to 
enjoy the option of leaving certain divisive issues - even fundamental 
ones - to the courts. If Congress were the ultimate principal in this 
agency relationship then Congress' wishes on this point would be deci-
sive. But, as Fisserman proclaims, the People are the ultimate princi-
pals here. If the Court becomes convinced that its role in revisiting 
statutory decisions is an inherently legislative one, then the constitu-
tional structure of separation of powers should be enough to justify the 
Court's invocation of the rule without congressional directive.31 
IV. REsPONSE TO MAcFJNLEY ET AL. 
Justices MacFinley and Kennedy raise a variety of objections to 
the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, suggesting that it is trivial 
as a practical matter and "[e]ven as an intellectual exercise ... [it] goes 
nowhere."32 Echoing one of the themes touched on by Justice Posner-
brook, MacFinley first argues that the small number of judicial over-
rulings of statutory decisions makes the question of an absolute rule 
trivial. The validity of this point depends on one's baseline however. 
If it is assumed that the current heightened rule is justifiable and ought 
to be preserved, then the absolute rule may not make a dramatic differ-
ence in the way courts and Congress look at statutory reinterpretation. 
If this baseline is accepted as the appropriate one, then my article's 
29. Id. at 2456-57. 
30. Id. at 2460. 
31. For those who remain unconvinced by this quasi-constitutional point, I am more than 
willing to have my proposal considered a petition to Congress as opposed to a brief to the Court. 
The functional merits of the approach do not depend on who initiates its adoption. 
32. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2461. 
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primary mission has been accomplished. Providing a coherent theo-
retical justification for the current approach to statutory precedents 
was the meat of my article. The suggestion that the rule be made ab-
solute was, so to speak, gravy. 
On the other hand, if MacFinley intends to suggest that no doc-
trine of stare decisis ever really matters to judges' decisions, I cannot 
agree. Notwithstanding the flexibility inherent in interpreting and ap-
plying precedents, rules of stare decisis often create significant con-
straints on the range of acceptable decisions. For example, I continue 
to maintain that the Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 33 
could not have "pretended to distinguish away" Runyon v. McCrary 34 
and "announce a new rule limiting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to private acts of 
discrimination without explicitly overruling Runyon. " 35 MacFinley 
asserts that I am "quite wrong" on this point, and that the Court's 
decision in Patterson actually demonstrates just how flexible precedent 
can be, because the five Justices in the majority seemed able to pass the 
"red-faced" test with impunity. 36 But nothing the majority did in Pat-
terson concerning Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 should have 
caused the Justices' faces to flush. Runyon did not decide whether on-
the-job harassment constitutes discrimination in the "making and en-
forcement" of contracts as forbidden by section 1981. The relevant 
part of Runyon was its holding that section 1981 applied to private 
action as well as state action, a conclusion the Court unanimously re-
affirmed in Patterson, notwithstanding the Court's declaration that 
"[s]ome Members of this Court believe that Runyon was decided in-
correctly."37 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "Our conclusion that we 
should adhere to our decision in Runyon that§ 1981 applies to private 
conduct is not enough to decide this case. We must decide also 
whether the conduct of which petitioner complains falls within one of 
the enumerated rights protected by§ 1981."38 One can easily disagree 
with Patterson's narrow definition of making and enforcing contracts, 
but there is no basis for accusing the Court of infidelity to precedent, 
. or using Patterson to demonstrate the pliability of precedent. 
Aside from her claim that my proposal is trivial and futile, 
MacFinley argues that it is internally incoherent. To begin with, she 
claims that to adopt my proposal the Court would be required to over-
33. 109 s. Ct. 2363 (1989). 
34. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
35. Marshall, supra note 3, at 218. 
36. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2463 n.34. 
37. 109 S. Ct. at 2370. 
38. 109 S. Ct. at 2372. 
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rule scores of previous cases in which it declared that statutory prece-
dents may be overruled under some vaguely defined circumstances. 
The easiest way for me to avoid this paradox is, of course, to call for 
Congress to enact a law imposing an absolute rule of statutory stare 
decisis on the Court. 39 I recognize that Congress is not likely to enact 
any such law anytime soon, however,40 and I am intent therefore on 
defending my proposal as one directed to the Court. 
Two factors relieve some of the paradox of overruling earlier cases 
in order to adopt a rule against overruling cases: first, the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the proposal41 make this something more than 
a pure matter of statutory (or even common law) construction; second, 
the lack of any clear binding precedent on how to deal with precedents 
makes the adoption of my proposal less than a clear overruling.42 As 
MacFinley demonstrates, however, neither of these answers provides a 
wholly coherent solution to the paradox my proposal has created.43 
To the extent that they are unsatisfying, the solution to this conun-
drum may rest in the notion of prospectivity. In its decision to adopt 
an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis the Court could, consistent 
with the old rule which allows for the repudiation of some old prece-
dents, prospectively repudiate the old rule and ~ounce that this is 
the last nonconstitutional precedent it would overrule. This solution 
might seem a bit artificial, and I offer it only for those who are unsatis-
fied with the previously advanced justifications. 
Another argument MacFinley raises is that my proposal does not 
go far enough on its own terms. Logically, she claims, the rule against 
overruling precedents ought not be limited to the Supreme Court's 
statutory interpretation decisions, but should be extended to matters 
upon which the lower courts have reached a clear cpnsensus. I do not 
_believe, however, that the doctrine need be, or should be, extended this 
far. To begin with, MacFinley has not explained how one would go 
about identifying a "consensus" oflower court decisions, and this diffi-
culty constitutes a significant distinction between a decision of the 
Supreme Court and a consensus among .lower courts. Moreover, ex-
tending the absolute rule of stare decisis to lower court decisions 
would put extreme pressure on the Supreme Court to alter its certio-
rari practice. In many cases the Court would have to grant review in 
39. Perhaps Congress could include this provision within a Statutory Construction Act, 
which would set forth some general rules of statutory construction for courts to follow. 
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
42. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 220 n.199. 
43. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2462-63. 
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order to review an issue before a consensus of lower court decisions 
develops, even if the case presenting the issue is not a good candidate 
for review or other more pressing issues need to be decided by the 
Court. A proposal that makes Supreme Court decisions binding inter-
pretations (as I have suggested) is in no way equivalent to one that 
would foreclose the Supreme Court from ever addressing some issues 
of statutory interpretation (as would happen under MacFinley's modi-
fication of my prqposal). Although an argument can be made for ex-
tending the absolute rule to lower court decisions, there is surely 
nothing incoherent about a proposal that recognizes the distinctions 
between the Supreme Court's and lower courts' decisions. 
Nor is it at all incoherent to limit the proposal to statutory deci-
sions, and not to advocate an absolute rule of stare decisis with respect 
to constitutional decisions as well. The typical role of the courts in 
interpreting the Constitution is substantially different from their nor-
mal role in statutory interpretation. The Constitution is replete with 
clauses that call on the courts to apply norms to ever changing polit-
ical and social circumstances. Consistent with the notion of the Con-
stitution as a living document, definitions and applications of terms 
like "due process," "cruel and unusual punishment," and "unreasona-
ble search and seizure" evolve over time. The specter of judges in-
serting content into these phrases is not an unfortunate or inevitable 
by-product of the framers' poor drafting or lack of foresight; it is a 
critical part of the process of breathing life into a document originated 
by those long dead. 44 Of course, the amendment process as set forth 
in article V is available as a mechanism of change, but it surely is not 
the design of the Constitution to require the support of a modem 
supermajority before the judiciary may declare a prior constitutional 
decision no longer valid.45 To require such supermajority support 
for implementation of a constitutional provision flouts the 
countermajoritarian nature of the Constitution itself. 
The courts' role in statutory interpretation is quite different. Here, 
there is a living Congress capable of making new policy choices that 
need to be made. Nothing about our political system makes resort to 
Congress the same kind of exceptional and dangerous enterprise that 
44. See Marshall, supra note 3, at 206. 
45. Although I do not advocate an absolute rule of stare decisis in constitutional cases, I do 
believe that the Court has become far too inclined to consider overruling its constitutional deci· 
sions. With respect to the flag-burning issue, for example, if a supermajority of the United States 
wishes to amend the Constitution to overrule Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), and 
United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744 (1990), they should not have to contend with the 
argument that the appointment of Justice Brennan's successor will, no doubt, enable the Court to 
reverse itself anyway. 
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resort to a constitutional amendment is. Government by the 
electorally accountable branch is the norm of our constitutional sys-
tem - a process that ought to be encouraged, not feared and avoided. 
It is clear, though, that MacFinley and Kennedy are not enamoi:ed 
of the political branches. They point out that minorities and wo~en 
are severely underrepresented in Congress and suggest that only well-
to-do, white, and I suppose heterosexual, males are likely to see Con-
gress as occupying the top of .the democracy continuum. They accuse 
me of ignoring. these dysfunctions in our political systeIQ., and suggest 
that I probably think that "things are significantly 'better' now" than 
they were in 1910, "for women and blacks are at least able to vote."46 
MacFinley and Kennedy are right: I do think things are much better 
now, although I also believe that there still is a long road ahead to 
travel. But I don't see how we improve our democracy by shifting 
policy choices away from the legislature and toward the courts. No 
matter how unrepresentative Congress may be, it will never come 
close to the unrepresentative status of federal judges, who, by the way, 
are not much more diverse than the body that confirms them. 47 
CONCLUSION 
The dominant theme that seems to run through· the Professor Es-
kridge's objections to my proposal to "Let Congress Do It" is his 
rather powerful contempt of Congress. Based on his distaste for con-
gressional decisionmaking, Eskridge is pleased to have the courts, in 
which he seems to have such unyielding trust, continue to make im-
portant policy choices in the course of their interpretations of statutes. 
I share many of Eskridge's concerns about the dysfunctions of our 
political system. Reform clearly is needed. But that reform should 
take the form of reflecting upon how we elect our representatives and 
how we monitor their work, not throwing up our hands and opting for 
government by the judiciary. 
46. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 2464. 
47. If recent legislative enactments reversing Supreme Court decisions are any indicator, 
Congress may, in fact, be far more protective than the courts of some of the groups McFinley has 
identified. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 
(responding to Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Civil Rights Act of 1990, S2140, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (bill to reverse a number of "conservative" Supreme Court decisions 
issued in the October 1988 Term). 
